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G
rowing public awareness of future pres-
sures on Social Security is eroding
many Americans’ confidence in this key
retirement program. These pressures are nearly
certain in the next century, stemming from the
retirement of the large baby-boom generation,
longer average life spans, and lower projected
fertility rates. To meet such pressures, various
reforms of Social Security have been proposed,
ranging from simple repairs to the current sys-
tem all the way to full privatization. In this
context, privatization usually means moving the
public retirement system toward a set of individ-
ual accounts with the workers’ funds invested
partly in private securities and with workers
having some measure of control over invest-
ment allocations.
Choosing among the competing reform pro-
posals is a daunting task. Supporters of privatiza-
tion believe such reforms would boost economic
efficiency, resulting in higher real output per
worker and helping the nation cope with the
future pressures from population aging. Support-
ers also believe privatization would produce a
retirement system that treats different genera-
tions more fairly. Critics fear, however, that the
privatization of Social Security would produce
a more unequal income distribution for retirees
and expose them to greater investment risks.
This article examines these fundamental issues
of economic efficiency and fairness that should
be weighed when considering Social Security
privatization. The first section summarizes the
challenges to the current system and outlines
various options for reform. The second section
explains how privatization could improve eco-
nomic efficiency, and briefly considers the diffi-
cult issue of the transition costs in moving from
the current system to full privatization. The third
section discusses important issues of fairness
within and across generations. Any decision to
privatize Social Security will require balancing
the likely gains of greater real output and fairer
returns to younger generations with the possible
adverse effects of a more unequal income distri-
bution among retirees and greater investment
risks. This balancing must occur through the
political process because fairness is a matter of
values rather than economic analysis.
I. THE GROWING INTEREST IN
PRIVATIZATION
The many achievements of Social Security
should not be forgotten in discussing possible
reforms. Social Security has provided a secure
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prepare the article.retirement income for millions of Americans,
lowering poverty rates among the elderly and
protecting working families against the disabil-
ity or premature death of a breadwinner. More-
over, such Social Security benefits are not
currently in jeopardy because the system faces
no immediate problem in meeting its financial
obligations. Recent interest in privatizing Social
Security comes, instead, from a growing aware-
ness of the pressures that will emerge in the early
decades of the next century, along with some
long-standing issues about how to balance eco-
nomic efficiency and fairness.
Financial challenges
Social Security is essentially a pay-as-you-go
retirement system in which most of the payroll
taxes paid in by employers and current employ-
ees are immediately paid out as benefits to retir-
ees. An estimated 144 million people paid
contributions to the old-age and survivors insur-
ance and disability insurance (OASDI) trust
funds in 1996, with the combined tax rate on
employers and employees being 12.4 percent.
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Benefits were paid to almost 44 million people
at the end of 1996, with initial benefit levels
depending on the workers’ earnings histories
and changes in national average wages. After
retirement, benefit levels are adjusted upward to
reflect changes in the consumer price level. 
Despite the existence of the OASDI trust
funds as an accounting device, Social Security
is really unfunded in the sense that there is no
portfolio of private securities backing the pro-
gram that could be sold to maintain future benefit
payments. Although Social Security is not esti-
mated to be in long-term balance, the system’s
tax income currently exceeds benefit payments.
The excess revenue is invested in special U.S.
government securities, helping reduce the net
borrowing requirements of the federal govern-
ment. But under existing law, the outgo from the
Social Security system is expected to exceed the
tax income in 2012, and this deficit would have
to be covered by the federal government either
through general tax revenues, such as the per-
sonal income tax, or debt issues by the U.S.
Treasury. Because Treasury debt is also serviced
with tax revenues, Social Security is ultimately
backed only by the taxing authority of the federal
government. In contrast, a fully funded private
pension would set aside enough stocks, bonds,
and other assets to make the expected future
payments to retirees.
The retirement of the baby-boom generation,
a gradual increase in average life expectancy,
and decreasing fertility are projected to put sub-
stantial upward pressure on benefit payments in
the next century (Chart 1). Outgo from the
OASDI programs is projected to rise from 4.7
percent of GDP in 1997 to 6.7 percent in 2070,
while OASDI tax income is projected to decline
slightly as a share of GDP. As a result, the current
modest surplus in the OASDI programs would
be converted to a deficit of about 2.1 percent of
GDP in 2070. Closing the projected deficit
within the current system would require either
cutting future retirement benefits or raising
Social Security taxes.
Social challenges
Social Security tries to balance various social
goals in providing for retirees, the disabled, and
their dependents. Although the promised level
of benefits increases with the worker’s average
earnings, Social Security also has an important
redistributional element, with low-income retir-
ees receiving greater benefits relative to their
past contributions than high-income partici-
pants. Social Security has important insurance
aspects, as well, helping protect workers and
their families against some of life’s unpleasant
surprises. Disability insurance is a clear exam-
ple, protecting participants and their families
22 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYagainst career-ending injuries. In addition, Social
Security provides insurance in that its benefits
continue no matter how long a retiree lives,
eliminating the risk of outliving one’s savings.
Inflation indexation of benefits also insures
retirees against unexpected changes in the pur-
chasing power of the dollar, a feature that rarely
exists in private pension plans. 
The balancing of social goals inevitably
involves tradeoffs between economic effi-
ciency and various—sometimes conflicting—
notions of fairness (Okun). Efficiency refers to
how much real output can be produced with a
given set of resources. Fairness refers to beliefs
about what is a just set of economic contribu-
tions and rewards. The income-redistribution
element of Social Security is a concrete example
of such tradeoffs. Because high-income par-
ticipants do not benefit in proportion to their
contributions, Social Security may discourage
labor supply and saving, lowering the real out-
put that can be produced with given economic
resources. But this redistributional element has
helped produce a more equal income distribu-
tion among the elderly, improving a situation
that many Americans had viewed as unfair.
Although disagreements about the tradeoffs
between economic efficiency and fairness have
always existed, growing awareness of the future
pressures on Social Security have brought these
Chart 1
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1997 23concerns to the foreground. Younger workers
have begun to realize that they will not benefit
from their Social Security contributions to the
same extent as past and current retirees. These
younger workers pay higher payroll tax rates
than earlier participants in the Social Security
system, and would experience a lower rate of
return from Social Security even without cuts in
future benefits. Opinion polls suggest that some
younger Americans are skeptical that they will
ever receive any benefits from the Social Secu-
rity system (U.S. News & World Report).
2 Yet
current retirees and older workers can also claim
that it would be unfair to jeopardize their retire-
ment security by cutting current payroll tax rates
to help younger workers when the older genera-
tions contributed for many years under the pres-
ent system and based their retirement plans on a
promised level of benefits. In striking a political
compromise to reform Social Security, such is-
sues of fairness are likely to be as important as
the issue of economic efficiency.
Options for reform
Growing awareness of the future challenges to
Social Security has prompted numerous pro-
posals for reforming the nation’s retirement
system. These proposals range from relatively
moderate changes in the current tax and benefit
structure to sweeping privatization of the entire
Social Security system. The report of the 1994-
96 Advisory Council on Social Security, sum-
marized in the box, gives an idea of the range of
proposals that are seriously being discussed.
Such discussion is appropriate even though Social
Security faces no immediate problem in making
benefit payments because any reforms should be
made as soon as possible so that current working-
age families can make the needed adjustments
in their savings plans. Moreover, prompt action
may help to reduce the size of the policy reform
that is ultimately necessary.
The Social Security system could be restored
to soundness while retaining the current pay-
as-you-go structure. Payroll tax increases and
gradual benefit cuts could restore solvency to
the system over the next 75 years, the period
used to assess Social Security’s long-range
actuarial soundness. In this respect, the United
States differs from many other industrial coun-
tries, where making such gradual adjustments is
not a viable option (Suttle). But many analysts
are concerned that changes in payroll tax rates
and benefit levels that would restore actuarial
soundness over the next 75 years might not be
sufficient, and that the system could quickly slip
back into a deficit.
3 Moreover, such changes
would not produce the fundamental shifts in the
tradeoffs between efficiency and fairness that
are sought by some reformers.
Many of the recent proposals to reform Social
Security involve some degree of privatization.
Some of the growing interest in privatization
stems from recent reforms of foreign public
pension systems. Chile made a pioneering effort
to privatize its pay-as-you-go retirement system
beginning in the early 1980s (Edwards, Dia-
mond and Valdes-Prieto). The new system was
structured around individual accounts managed
by private investment companies. The Chilean
government retains an important role in the new
system, however, by guaranteeing a minimum
pension to poorer participants and a minimum
return on funds accumulated in the individual
accounts. The successes of the Chilean reform
have encouraged privatization efforts in other
Latin American countries as well as Australia
and the United Kingdom. 
In the context of Social Security reform, the
term privatization rarely means a total with-
drawal of the U.S. government from the nation’s
retirement system. The current debate generally
accepts the idea that government should man-
date some minimum saving rate by workers to
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REPORT OF THE 1994-96 SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL
Members of the 1994-96 Advisory Council
were unable to agree on a specific plan to
restore long-term actuarial balance to the So-
cial Security program. Members did broadly
agree on some general principles, including
the compulsory nature of the program, partial
advance funding of future benefits, and the
need for early action to reform Social Security.
The Council then presented three options
backed by different groups of members.
Maintain benefits
Six members favored a plan that would
largely maintain the present Social Security
benefit and tax structure. This plan would
make technical adjustments reducing future
benefits by about 3 percent, and would gain
additional revenue by more complete federal
income taxation of Social Security benefits
and a redirection of some taxes on OASDI
benefits now going into the Hospital Insur-
ance Trust Fund. To keep the program from
drifting out of balance later in the next century,
the plan would raise the combined employer-
employee payroll tax by 1.6 percent in 2045.
This plan also calls for further study of invest-
ing up to 40 percent of the OASDI trust funds
in corporate stocks, with the expected higher
return on stocks helping to bring Social Secu-
rity into long-term actuarial balance.
Individual accounts
Two members favored a plan that would
create individual defined-contribution accounts
held with the Social Security system. Contri-
butions would be mandatory, equaling 1.6 per-
cent of covered payroll. Individuals would have
limited choices about how these accounts would
be invested, choosing among such options as
bond index funds and equity index funds. The
social adequacy protections of the current
system would largely be preserved, but the
future growth of Social Security benefits would
be reduced by accelerating the already legislated
increase in the age of eligibility for full retire-
ment benefits, lengthening the benefits compu-
tation period, and adjusting the benefits schedule
for middle-wage and high-wage workers.
Personal security accounts
 Five members favored a plan that would
give individual accounts a much more important
role than in the previous plan. Social Security
would have two tiers, with the first tier being
a flat rate benefit that would be below the pov-
erty level. The second tier would be fully
funded defined-contribution accounts referred
to as personal security accounts. These accounts
would be funded with 5 percent of the current
payroll tax, and the funds would not be held
or managed by the government. When fully
effective, first-tier benefits would be financed
by the 7.4 percent portion of the payroll tax not
used to fund personal security accounts. To
cover the average transition costs to the new
system, the plan envisions a 72-year payroll
tax increase of 1.52 percent. Federal borrow-
ing would increase in the early decades of the
transition, but the additional federal debt
would be retired in later decades with the
higher payroll tax receipts.
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generally accepts the idea that government
should provide some tax benefits for such sav-
ings. Beyond this common ground, a wide range
of privatization proposals is possible. But pri-
vatization proposals generally involve invest-
ing some portion of the worker’s contributions
in individual accounts that are controlled to
some degree by the worker and that would have
uncertain investment returns.
The more ambitious privatization proposals
would eventually shift all retirees out of the
pay-as-you-go system into privately managed
accounts similar to IRAs or 401k plans (Altig
and Gokhale, Kotlikoff and Sachs). Workers
would choose their own fund managers and,
possibly, would be allowed to contribute more
than the government-mandated percentage of
their payroll. As a result, workers’ retirement
incomes would more closely reflect their own
contributions, which would depend on their
earnings and thriftiness while working. Work-
ers’ retirement incomes would also reflect the
performance of their privately managed invest-
ment funds, which partly would depend on
workers’ ability to pick investment managers
and their willingness to hold riskier investments,
such as corporate stocks. In some plans, private
disability insurance would even replace the gov-
ernment’s disability insurance program.
Less ambitious proposals might direct a
smaller portion of payroll contributions into
individual accounts, putting the rest into a more
traditional public retirement system (Advisory
Council on Social Security, Committee for Eco-
nomic Development). The individual accounts
would provide a tighter link between workers’
contributions and benefits, improving their incen-
tives to work and save. A scaled-back version of
the current Social Security system could guarantee
some minimum level of retirement benefits to
all workers, regardless of their earnings history,
and provide benefits for the disabled. Within this
group of proposals, wide variations are possible—
for example, the percent of payroll contributions
directed toward individual accounts might vary
substantially. In addition, some plans would
restrict the investment options for individual
accounts to a limited number of government-
approved funds in order to hold down adminis-
trative costs and limit the risks assumed by
participants.
Because there are so many reform plans with
differing details, this article will not attempt
to catalog or evaluate all the major proposals.
Instead, the remainder of the article will focus
on the conceptual issues of economic efficiency
and fairness that must be weighed in addressing
the challenges to the Social Security system.
II. PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY
Privatization often improves people’s incen-
tives to produce in an economically efficient
manner. Greater efficiency means that a given
amount of resources could be combined to pro-
duce greater real output than before, potentially
allowing everyone to experience a higher living
standard. This section begins by showing that
privatization of Social Security would probably
raise real output through improved incentives to
work and save. Then, the section turns to the
special need for increased efficiency when the
baby-boom generation retires and to the transi-
tion costs associated with moving to a funded
public retirement system.
Effects on economic efficiency
Critics of the current system contend that
Social Security lowers real output by reducing
the labor supply and the saving rate. The effect
on the labor supply arises because the Social
Security payroll tax substantially reduces the
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the payroll tax can be viewed as a contribution
to a retirement system promising future benefits,
the rate of return on these contributions is sub-
stantially less than the average historical return
on private investments, such as corporate equi-
ties. Moreover, future retirement benefits do not
rise proportionally with payroll tax payments as
employee income rises. As a result, payroll
taxes reduce the after-tax rewards from work-
ing. This disincentive to work may affect not
only the decision to enter the labor force but also
such labor decisions as the number of hours
worked and the degree of effort (Feldstein
1995). Empirical studies of labor supply gener-
ally support the view that higher payroll taxes
reduce the amount of labor supplied and,
thereby, lower real GDP.
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Whether or not Social Security reduces pri-
vate saving is a more controversial issue. The
life-cycle theory of consumption implies that
spending and saving decisions depend on a
household’s lifetime resources, including cur-
rent income, expected future income, and
wealth. Actually, the effect of higher Social
Security wealth on personal saving is theoreti-
cally ambiguous. To the extent that anticipated
Social Security benefits are a component of
wealth, households may increase their con-
sumption relative to income during the working
years, implying a lower private saving rate. But
higher Social Security wealth also might induce
some workers to retire at an earlier age. Such
workers might increase their saving during the
working years to accumulate enough assets for
the longer expected retirement.
Recent empirical studies tend to support the
view that Social Security reduces the private
saving rate. Although some past studies have
found no effect, Feldstein (1996b) estimated
that an increase in Social Security wealth of one
dollar reduces private saving by two to three
cents.
5 Because Social Security wealth is more
than twice the gross domestic product, and
because the nation saves a relatively small frac-
tion of its annual income, this seemingly small
impact per dollar of Social Security wealth is
actually a large percentage of total private sav-
ing.
6 In the aggregate, these estimates imply that
the Social Security program reduces private sav-
ing by almost 60 percent.
The effect of Social Security on the private
capital stock ultimately depends, however, on
national saving rather than private saving.
National saving is the sum of private saving and
the government budget surplus. The current sur-
plus in the Social Security system reduces the
overall government budget deficit and raises
national saving, assuming other federal expen-
ditures and tax receipts are held constant.
7 Or put
another way, the Social Security surplus cur-
rently reduces the federal government’s borrow-
ing in financial markets, leaving more private
saving available to buy equipment and build
factories. However, the estimated annual reduc-
tion in private saving by Social Security greatly
exceeds the program’s current surplus, implying
Social Security causes a substantial net reduc-
tion in national saving. Lower saving would, in
turn, produce a smaller stock of productive capi-
tal, such as factories and machinery, and lower
real output per worker.
8
On efficiency grounds, the primary argument
against privatization has been that a privatized
public pension system would suffer from higher
administrative costs than the current pay-as-
you-go system. High administrative costs have
been an issue in other countries, such as Chile
and Mexico, that have introduced elements of
privatization in their national retirement systems.
A fully privatized system might have operating
costs similar in percentage terms to a defined-
contribution pension plan. In the United States,
such percentage costs typically exceed those for
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ized national retirement system might, however,
reduce administrative costs by restricting work-
ers’ investment options to low-cost alternatives,
such as index funds, and workers would always
have the option of making such low-cost invest-
ments even if the system did not require it.
Taken as a whole, the evidence is fairly per-
suasive that the current Social Security system
results in large continuing losses in U.S. real
output. Feldstein (1996a) estimated that, under
conservative assumptions, the loss from the cur-
rent system exceeds 4 percent of real GDP. Any
increase in administrative costs from privatiza-
tion would likely be outweighed by the large rise
in real output caused by the increased labor
supply and saving.
9
Problems caused by population aging
The prospects for large gains in real output
would be intriguing under any circumstances,
but this is especially so in light of the future
aging of the U.S. population. Such large gains
in real output could help the nation support a
Table 1
THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGE
Calendar year Total fertility rate Life expectancy at age 65 (years) Dependency ratio
    M a l e       Female 
Historical
1950 3.03 12.8 15.1 .138
1960 3.61 12.9 15.9 .173
1970 2.43 13.1 17.1 .185
1980 1.85 14.0 18.4 .195
1990 2.07 15.0 19.0 .209
Projected
2000 2.00 15.8 19.3 .211
2010 1.95 16.2 19.6 .214
2020 1.90 16.6 20.0 .275
2030 1.90 17.0 20.4 .355
2040 1.90 17.5 20.9 .369
2050 1.90 17.8 21.3 .372
2060 1.90 18.2 21.7 .398
2070 1.90 18.6 22.1 .410
Note: The total fertility rate is the average number of children who would be born to a woman in her lifetime if she
were to experience the birth rates by age observed in the selected year. The dependency ratio is the population aged 65
and over, divided by the population aged 20-64.
Source: Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds
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burdens on future working-age families.
 The dimensions of population aging can be
seen in Table 1, which illustrates some of the
demographic factors behind the Social Security
projections. Although the U.S. fertility rate was
well above 3 children per woman at the peak of
the postwar baby boom in the 1960s, this rate
has fallen to around 2 children in the 1990s and
is expected to decline somewhat further. At the
same time, retirees have been living longer, and
a gradual further rise in life expectancy seems
likely. With the baby boom and longer average
life spans swelling the ranks of the retired, and
with recent lower birth rates limiting the future
working-age population, the ratio of popula-
tion aged 65 years and over to the working-age
population is projected to nearly double by
2070. Because a pay-as-you-go retirement sys-
tem derives its revenues from workers, the
worsening dependency ratio suggests that pay-
roll tax rates on future workers could rise
sharply, possibly lowering the living standards
of future working-age families.
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The key economic issue in meeting future
pressures from population aging is how to raise
the nation’s real output per person. If real output
can grow fast enough in coming decades, future
working age families might be able to shoulder
a higher payroll tax burden and still have a
higher average living standard than current
working-age families. Increasing future real
output per person could stem from two main
sources, a higher national saving rate and faster
technological progress.
As the previous section showed, privatization
has the potential to produce large gains in real
output per person by raising the national saving
rate. Privatization proposals should, however,
be compared with other policy changes that
might prepare the nation for the pressures from
population aging in the next century. For exam-
ple, an alternative to privatization might be to
modify the current system through a package of
benefit cuts and revenue increases. The addi-
tional revenue might come from a consumption-
tax or value-added tax, which are believed to
distort labor supply and saving decisions less
than payroll and income taxes. In addition,
such a package might include further spending
restraint by the federal government, resulting in
a budget surplus that adds to national saving by
reducing the government’s claim on financial
resources. How such a package would compare
with privatization is an issue requiring further
study, but there clearly are ways the nation could
become better prepared for the pressures from
population aging even without privatizing
Social Security.
The transition problem
A major issue in privatizing Social Security is
how to pay for the transition from the current
pay-as-you-go system to a privatized retirement
system. Because the current system is unfunded,
those who are working during the transition
period would be required to contribute to their
own retirement accounts under the new system
while continuing to fund the benefits promised
to current retirees and older generations of
workers. Financing such a transition sounds, at
first, like an insurmountable obstacle. However,
recent research offers hope that a properly struc-
tured transition plan could privatize Social
Security  without imposing an undue burden on
current working generations.
For example, Feldstein and Samwick (1997)
concluded that a properly structured privatiza-
tion plan could maintain currently legislated
retirement benefits indefinitely with only a
moderate initial increase in the combined rate of
the payroll tax and mandatory saving. This com-
bined rate would initially be 14.4 percent, only
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tax rate. Mandatory contributions to an individ-
ual account would be invested in corporate
stocks and bonds, with the government rebating
corporate tax payments to these accounts so that
the funds would earn the full pre-tax real return
to capital, which Feldstein and Samwick put at
about 9 percent annually. Because such a return
is much higher than is implicit in the present
pay-as-you-go retirement system, a low level of
contributions, about 2 percent, to these individual
accounts would yield the same future benefits as
the present Social Security system. The remain-
ing portion of the contributions would be available
to pay the promised benefits to those covered
under the current pay-as-you-go system.
The transition to a privatized system in Feld-
stein and Samwick’s model could be accom-
plished in various ways, but most likely would
be spread over a long period. Over time, an
increasing proportion of retirement benefits
would be prefunded, allowing gradual reduc-
tions in the payroll tax rate. Eventually, the
combined rate for payroll taxes and mandatory
saving would fall substantially below the cur-
rent payroll tax rate. In this proposal, some
middle-aged to older workers might experience
a small decline in welfare, but younger and
unborn generations would likely experience
substantial gains.
Other ways of handling the transition to a
privatized national retirement system might
produce large aggregate gains in future real
output, while making no age cohort of workers
or retirees worse off than under the present
system. For example, the costs of the transition
to a privatized system might be shared with
future generations by government borrowing
that would be paid off partly with tax receipts
from generations as yet unborn. Some proposals
would more quickly privatize the national retire-
ment system by setting up individual accounts
for all current workers regardless of age. Work-
ers would receive credit for their past contribu-
tions to the pay-as-you-go system by receiving
“recognition bonds” equal in value to their
accrued Social Security wealth, a device used
successfully in privatizing Chile’s retirement
system. These bonds would be added to the
individual accounts and be paid off with future
government revenues.
But it is important to recognize in closing this
section that estimates of the future size of the
Social Security problem and the benefits of
privatization are uncertain. Estimates of future
Social Security deficits depend partly on such
difficult-to-forecast factors as fertility rates and
productivity growth. The Social Security Admini-
stration’s intermediate projections assume reason-
able but fairly moderate growth of productivity
and, thus, real output in the next century. If
future productivity growth is much stronger
than assumed in the coming century, as some
analysts expect, population aging could put rela-
tively modest pressures on the Social Security
system and the living standards of future work-
ing-age families. Estimates of the benefits from
privatization are also uncertain. For example,
empirical estimates of how changes in tax rates
affect labor supply and saving behavior differ,
and the size of these effects and the speed with
which they occur could substantially affect the
estimated transition costs and the long-run effi-
ciency gains from privatization. Despite these
uncertainties, however, it does seem likely that
Social Security will experience substantial pres-
sures in the next century, and that privatization
could help meet these pressures by increasing
real output per worker.
III. PRIVATIZATION AND
ECONOMIC FAIRNESS
Besides increasing aggregate real output, pri-
vatization is sometimes viewed as making the
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can be measured along many dimensions, and
beliefs about fairness differ. For example, some
people believe the issue of intergenerational
fairness strongly tips the balance in favor of
privatization. Others believe, however, that pri-
vatization would have adverse effects on the
income distribution within any given generation
of retirees, which could outweigh any gains in
fairness across generations. Whether or not to
privatize Social Security may ultimately depend
as much on beliefs about fairness as on the
uncertain estimates of how much Social Secu-
rity reduces the nation’s real output.
Fairness across generations
Critics of the current system point to the low
implicit rates of return to younger generations
of workers. Looked at as an investment, contri-
butions to the Social Security system by the
baby-boom generation and younger generations
are likely to yield substantially lower returns
than were received by Social Security’s earliest
participants. The decline in rates of return is
partly inherent in the maturing of a pay-as-you-
go retirement system. The earliest participants
in Social Security were granted full benefits
without making payroll contributions over their
entire working lives. Workers who made contri-
butions throughout their careers would inevita-
bly pay more taxes to receive their benefits,
experiencing a lower return relative to what was
paid in. However, this general effect was repeated
when Congress expanded Social Security bene-
fits in the years after the system was established,
helping provide better returns for later genera-
tions of participants. With current workers pay-
ing throughout their careers and unlikely to
experience further boosts in real benefits, rates
of return can be expected to remain lower.
Opponents of privatization sometimes argue
that a fully privatized system could produce
unfair intergenerational outcomes because the rate
of return on retirement savings would be highly
uncertain. Although corporate stocks have
higher average rates of return than a pay-as-you-
go system, stock market returns are much more
volatile. As a result, one generation of workers
might experience higher or lower returns than
another based on when they should happen to
acquire or dispose of their investments. Such
risks also exist in defined-contribution retire-
ment plans, which are increasingly popular with
U.S. companies. Opponents of privatization argue
that with growing amounts of Americans’ sav-
ings subject to market fluctuations, it becomes
even more important that Social Security’s
returns be predictable over the long term.
An additional uncertainty facing the baby-
boom generation is whether the retirement of
such a large population group will have unusual
effects on financial asset prices. Proposals for
privatizing Social Security generally assume
that average future returns from the stock market
will be similar to those in the past. But some
observers fear that large sales of stocks by the
baby-boom generation to fund its retirement
might depress stock and bond prices (Scheiber
and Shoven). For the near future, at least, the
effects of the baby-boom generation on finan-
cial asset prices are likely to remain uncertain.
Research on the relationship between demo-
graphics and asset prices is still at a relatively
early stage. The research to date suggests that
population aging may have important effects on
saving rates and financial asset markets, but
existing studies do not give clear guidance as to
the magnitude or timing of such effects (Bakshi
and Chen, Kydland and Petersen, Yoo).
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Fairness across income classes
The current Social Security system also reflects
the belief that some income redistribution
among retirees of a given generation is fair. The
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is designed so that low-income participants
receive higher benefits relative to their past pay-
roll tax payments than do high-income partici-
pants. Under current law, the real rate of return
on the contributions of a single worker born in
1930 is about 3.5 percent for a low-wage worker,
but only 1.5 percent for a worker earning the
maximum wage (Advisory Council on Social
Security). Moreover, low-income retirees are
highly dependent on Social Security for their
living. Payments from the OASDI programs
accounted for 84 percent of the income of aged
families in the lowest income quintile, but only
21 percent of the income for those in the highest
quintile (Aaron and Bosworth).
Americans differ widely in their beliefs about
the fairness of income redistribution. A more
equal income distribution has been considered a
worthy goal in the past, as witnessed by the
progressive structure of income tax rates and the
structure of Social Security itself. But some of
the support for income redistribution may have
eroded, as suggested by efforts in recent decades
to flatten the tax rate structure and reform the
welfare system. It is unclear, however, that sup-
port for income redistribution has eroded to the
point where Americans would want to strip it
entirely from the public pension system, particu-
larly if this reform meant a rise in poverty rates
among the elderly.
Critics of privatization proposals have also
emphasized that the greater risks of individual
investment accounts could raise the percentage
of elderly households living below the poverty
level. A sharp decline in stock prices or a pro-
longed period of below-average returns might
plunge many low-income households into pov-
erty. High-income households would also expe-
rience reduced living standards in this event, but
such households would be less likely to fall
below the poverty line because they would have
a greater amount invested in their individual
accounts, and because such households often
have private pension plans or other assets out-
side the public retirement system. Low-income
households also might suffer in retirement if
they lack the education or experience needed to
select good investment advisors charging rea-
sonable fees.
A privatized public pension system could be
designed to alleviate the adverse effects on low-
income participants. Many proposals for Social
Security reform are, after all, hybrids of a truly
private plan and a more traditional Social Secu-
rity component, which could provide a mini-
mum assured level of benefits to all participants.
Instead of such a two-tier plan, the government
could make additional payments to the individ-
ual accounts of low-income workers, producing
a higher expected real income in retirement and
reducing the chances of falling into poverty. And
even if a purely privatized system were adopted,
the nation could give assistance to the elderly
poor through such programs as Medicaid and
welfare. Some critics of privatization fear, how-
ever, that separating income redistribution from
the public retirement system would undermine
public support for income redistribution altogether.
Protecting against life’s uncertainties
Proposals to privatize Social Security must
also consider whether or not to keep the protec-
tions that the current system provides against
such adverse events as the death or disability of
a family breadwinner. Such events are often
viewed as capricious and unfair, particularly
when the breadwinner was otherwise willing
and able to support the family. As a result, there
has been widespread support for retaining disabil-
ity and survivors insurance, either through a
separate government-administered plan or the
required purchase of private disability insurance.
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Social Security system is that it also provides
protection against outliving one’s savings. Indi-
viduals who happen to live an unusually long
life can continue to receive Social Security
benefits, with the real value of these benefits
preserved through inflation adjustments. Critics
of privatization question whether a fully privat-
ized system can provide similar protection at a
reasonable cost. Mandated contributions under
a privatized system likely would be set to pro-
vide adequate retirement assets for an average,
or perhaps somewhat longer than average, life
span. Individuals with an unusually long life
could, thus, face a serious risk of using up their
assets and falling into poverty.
A possible solution to this risk under a privat-
ized system is to allow—or require—purchase
of a retirement annuity with the proceeds accu-
mulated in the individual’s retirement account.
An annuity could provide a guaranteed income
stream regardless of how long the individual
lives. However, privately provided annuities are
often viewed as being expensive, and such
annuities are rarely available in an inflation-
protected form. Some reformers have proposed
that the government become involved in organ-
izing group annuities, possibly even requiring
the purchase of an annuity when the employee
reaches retirement age (Kotlikoff and Sachs).
Others have argued, however, that such require-
ments would defeat the objective of turning the
primary responsibility for retirement decisions
back to the individual. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Population aging will inevitably place pres-
sures on U.S. productive resources in the com-
ing century. Future workers will have to produce
enough real output to support their own families
and a larger retired population. Although health
care is beyond the scope of this article, popula-
tion aging is also likely to cause huge increases
in the demand for medical care, and the nation
will probably have to find more resources to
meet this demand. Faced with such nearly cer-
tain pressures, efficiency-increasing options
such as privatization look attractive. However,
reform proposals will also have to balance pos-
sible increases in efficiency with the effects on
economic fairness. The issue of intergenera-
tional fairness is often cited by supporters of
privatization, while defenders of the current sys-
tem express concern about the income distribu-
tion and poverty rates among the elderly.
Although economic research can help to clarify
the tradeoffs, economists have no special com-
petence in making value judgments. Ultimately,
the balancing of efficiency and fairness must
occur through the political process.
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1 The article will not discuss the problems of the federal
hospital insurance (HI) program, commonly known as
“Part A” of Medicare. This program is financed by payroll
taxes on employers and employees with a combined rate
of 2.9 percent in 1996, putting the total tax rate for the
OASDI and HI programs at 15.3 percent. Although the HI
program faces severe pressures in the next century as the
population ages, such pressures will not be analyzed here
because hospitalization insurance raises many complicated
issues that are beyond the scope of this article.
2 This view appears to be overly pessimistic. Based on the
intermediate projections, current tax rates would still cover
about 70 percent of promised benefits at the end of the
long-run projection period (Advisory Council on Social
Security, p. 59).
3 Some worsening in Social Security’s finances is likely
under existing benefit and tax rate schedules because the
population will probably continue to age in the final
decades of the next century, decades that are not yet
included in the official actuarial estimates. This problem is
widely recognized, and some reform proposals have tried
to take it into account so that the system would not slip
quickly back into deficit as the 75-year projection period
moves forward with the passage of time.
In addition, some economists distrust the intermediate
projections for Social Security because these projections
have often been too optimistic about the system’s actuarial
soundness in the past. Kotlikoff and Sachs preferred the
Social Security Administration’s pessimistic projections as
a more conservative estimate of the system’s future
finances, while Gokhale argued that Social Security’s
realized income and outgo have historically fallen between
the intermediate and pessimistic projections. Nevertheless,
this article presents the intermediate projections because
these figures are commonly used in discussing Social
Security’s problems, and the projections are based on
reasonable economic and demographic assumptions.
4 Feldstein (1996a) estimated that the “deadweight loss”
of the Social Security payroll tax was $68 billion in 1995.
Eliminating this deadweight loss would raise GDP by
about 1 percent annually.
5 Findings by Feldstein (1974) were challenged by Leimer
and Lesnoy and other researchers in the 1970s and 1980s.
However, Feldstein (1996b) corrected the problems in his
earlier study and, using longer sample periods and
alternative measures of Social Security wealth, confirmed
the result that the Social Security system reduces the
private saving rate. This basic conclusion was also obtained
from cross-section studies examining a large number of
individual savers (Blinder, Gordon, and Wise; Diamond
and Hausman), although such studies obtained differing
estimates of the size of the effect.
6 These estimates were made with gross Social Security
wealth, which is the present value of future Social Security
benefits. Net Social Security wealth, which equals gross
Social Security wealth minus the present value of future
Social Security taxes, is roughly 1.5 times GDP (Feldstein
1996a).
7 Is it reasonable to assume that all other federal spending
and tax receipts are constant? Without the current Social
Security surplus, Congress and the President might feel
greater pressures to cut government spending or raise taxes
to reduce the budget deficit. Therefore, the Social Security
surplus may, to some degree, encourage a larger deficit in
the non-Social Security portion of the federal budget. Most
likely, the Social Security surplus does still contribute to
national saving, but by less than the officially recorded
amount (Feldstein 1996a).
8 The effect of a lower national saving rate on the U.S.
capital stock would be reduced to the extent that capital
moves across national borders. Lower domestic saving
would tend to raise the real return on capital, attracting
funds from abroad and helping maintain domestic real
output. But the after-tax return on this foreign-owned
capital would accrue to foreigners, reducing the
consumption opportunities of U.S. citizens compared with
a case where the capital stock is domestically owned.
Empirical evidence suggests, however, that relatively little
of the lost domestic saving is replaced by international
capital flows (Feldstein and Horioka).
9 Mariger provided a more critical assessment of recent
privatization proposals. He argued that shifting to a funded
retirement system could have the greatest effect on national
saving, and that such a reform could be accomplished
within either a public retirement system or a mandatory
system of private accounts.
10 Aaron noted that the true burden on future working-age
families may be less than the projected increase in the
number of retirees per worker would suggest.  At the same
time that the population is aging, the number of dependent
children per worker is expected to gradually decline.  As a
result, the total number of dependents per worker would
34 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYincrease much less rapidly in the next century than the
number of retirees per worker.  The rise in the elderly
population per worker is, however, a much more certain
development than the decline in the number of dependent
children per worker because past projections of the fertility
rate by demographers have often gone far astray—for
example, the postwar baby boom was not widely
anticipated by demographers.
11 Another source of uncertainty about the future retirement
resources of the baby-boom generation is possible changes in
the real price of housing. Much of the wealth of the average
American household is tied up in home equity. Future
retirees could potentially pay their living expenses and
medical bills either by selling their homes or borrowing
against their home equity. Mankiw and Weill have argued
that the aging of the baby-boom generation is likely to
prompt a sharp decline in real housing prices, depriving
American families of some part of this wealth. But other
analysts, such as Holland and Swan, have argued that
forecasts of a sharp decline in housing prices are based on
a flawed analysis.
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